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In this article researchers will explain about Business Judgment Rule and how it can be used as 
a defence by the directors’ of the corporation. In simple language it can be said that the “Business 
judgment rule” is nothing but a judicially evolved doctrine derived out of case laws in the field of 
corporate laws. This doctrine has its origin in USA followed by U.K. The rule is in use in some form or 
the other in the common law countries e.g. whales, Australia, Canada, India &c. Australia has codified 
this rule under sec.1180(2) Corporations Act 2001, in South Africa Companies Act 71 of 200 section 
76(4) provides for director’s duty to work towards best interest of the business with due care, skill and 
diligence, in India section 166(2) of Companies Act, 2013 requires that for the benefit of different 
constituencies of a company a director must act bona fide to promote the object of the company. The 
Business Judgment Rule tries to protect the directors of the company by creating a safe harbour for 
those who works for the betterment and interest of the corporations in an honest manner and in good 
faith. The scope of the paper is restricted to mainly US decisions, which has seen the greatest 
development in interpreting cases, though certain important landmarks in the Indian and UK context 
have also been referred to. The paper is limited by secondary sources such as books, articles and 
reports available on the subject. 
Key Words: Business Judgment Rule, Directors, Duties of director, Companies Act, Duty of care and 
skill, Duty of loyalty, Defences for breach of duty by director, standard of conduct, Takeover defences. 
Meaning: 
Business judgment rule is a misnomer as it does not have any compulsory content neither it is 
codified. It does not lay down any do‟s or don‟ts for the directors of the corporations, decided in 
American Society for Testing Material v. Corrpro Companies Inc.
1
 It calls for less interference by the 
courts as under this rule courts presume that the directors of who deal with the affairs of the corporation 
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and take decisions with respect to management, takeovers, merger, acquisition etc. will do it in a bona 
fide manner and in the interest of the company. 
Under this rule one can challenge actions of the board of directors but again due to above 
mentioned presumption the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff held in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor
 2
 
to give evidences showing that the directors of the company breached any of their fiduciary duty which 
they owed towards the corporation like duty of care, loyalty, good faith, on an informed basis and if they 
fail to do so the rule protects the directors and their decisions.  
Hindsight v Foresight  
   “The hindsight of judges is not sufficient for judging the foresight of directors.”  
The business judgment rule is deep-rooted in history for more than 100-year in where courts usually 
avoid replacing the decision of the board with judgment of court.
3
 In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation.
4
, court said that the spirit of this rule is that courts will not apply 20/20 hindsight to 
prognosticate the director‟s decision except in atypical cases where transaction cannot seems to be so 
erroneous on its face that directors approval fails the test of business judgment rule, because as held in 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. - “nothing is as easy as to be wise after the event.”
5
  The simple question to be 
asked is whether judges can perform directors‟ function efficiently? Can they take future business 
decisions without knowing the exact outcome? For deciding whether the path taken was reasonable or 
not after the happening of an even is not a difficult task but to foresee the outcome prior to that is.
6
 For 
directors who fulfills the conditions of the rule are not liable to the stockholders for decision that turns 
out to be bad even if that decision turn out to be bad in hindsight.
7
 Reason being that simple negligence 
alone is not sufficient for holding an officer or director personally liable to the corporation. 
In the words of Franklin Gevurtz:
8
 
„In black letter, the „business judgment‟ rule sustains corporate transactions and immunizes 
management from liability where the transaction is within the powers of the corporation (intra-vires) and 
the authority of management, and involves the exercise of due care and compliance with applicable 
fiduciary duties.‟ 
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FIDUCIARY DUTIES:   
In City equitable Fire Insurance Co. as per Romer J.
9
- Fiduciary duties means duty to act as 
trustees, but to expound directors as trustees does not hold to be strictly perfect nor unfailingly helpful 
today in the present scenario calling directors‟ as the trustees of the company or its property would be a 
misnomer instead they can be said to be the agents of the company. By referring them as an agent they 
stand in fiduciary relationship to the company. The duties of care and good faith which this relationship 
puts are virtually similar to those imposed on trustees, and to this extent the explanation “trustee” still 
holds well. Therefore directors acting as trustees are required to carry out the affairs with a view to 
promote common interest of the stakeholders and not their own interest. By virtue of acquiring office 
they undertake to give their judgment in the best interest of the company, unfettered by any inimical 
interest of their own.‟ 
In Permanent Building Society (in liq) v. Wheeler 
10
 decided that fiduciary powers and duties of 
director may be exercised only for the purpose for which they were conferred and not for any other 
subordinate or improper purpose. It must be shown that the major purpose was improper or subordinate 
to their duties as directors of the company. The Court shall determine whether but for any the dishonest, 
corrupt or subordinate purpose the directors would have indulged in the act impugned. 
Lastly, we can see from catena cases that if put in application, the business judgment rule forbids 
a judicial review of a board's decision, regardless of the accuracy or the brilliance of a decision. The rule 
of presumption notably not only does it safeguard risk involving decisions, but as courts and professors 
radiantly tell us it also guards against imprudent, horrendous, and egregious decisions,
11
whereas tort law 
would never allow the fool person defence. 
DUTY OF CARE AND SKILL 
The directors of the corporation are having fiduciary duties towards the corporation namely duty 
of care, duty of loyalty and duty to carry out their work lawfully. Of which duty of care concerns us the 
most with respect to business judgment rule. Putting it simply we can say that directors while managing 
the functions of the corporation are required to act as a prudent man will do in ordinary circumstances 
and the same to be in the best interest of the company.  
Actions of the directors are guarded by business judgment rule and presumption is that any 
decision taken by them would not go against the interest of the corporation unless such decisions are a 
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complete sham or waste. Under this rule decisions which are so one sided that a prudent man would not 
consider the same say for example agreeing for low bid during takeovers, paying more for acquiring 
assets, going wrong while deciding for mergers etc.  He is under a moral duty to act carefully because 
his actions might result in injury to others thus it involves substantial risk. Say for example a doctor 
owes a duty of care towards his patient while operating him. 
The duties imposed on the directors can be identified in following ways 
 Duty to conduct business of the corporation and monitor the same in an informed manner. 
 Duty to enquire into the information received by having regular follow ups. 
 Duty to apply pr3udent decision making methodology. 
Under duty of care directors will not be responsible for any bad judgment but they would be 
questioned if they fail to apply reasonable decision where required. The definition of care as given in the 
case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. is followed as a guiding rule for standard of 
care; care was defined as “gross negligence”
12
. Two questions were discussed in this case firstly what 
amount of care is to be applied by the director as required by law and secondly in case of supervision of 
employees what degree of care is required by them. Answering the first question court decided in 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
13
that: “amount of care which ordinarily careful and 
prudent men would use in similar circumstances” they are not required to act as an expertise in that field 
would do
14
.  One thing to be pointed here is that duty of care may not be the same in all circumstances 
and degree of care may vary depending upon the case and situation. In another leading case of Case v. 
New York Central Railroad Co., the court lowered the standard of duty of care based on the fact that a 
majority-minority relation had appeared.
15
 Whereas in the case of Treadway Companies Inc. v. Care 
Corporation
16
, the majority acknowledged the lack of correspondence in case law and held that 
directors‟ proper and good faith conduct insulate them from liability. 
Duty of Loyalty: 
Amongst fiduciary duties of the directors next comes duty of loyalty it demands director to be 
fully loyal to the corporation in all times. It also requires them to avoid decisions having possible 
conflicting interest, by doing this they stop them from indulging in any self-dealing or taking advantage 
of position to have personal gain. In the case of NorlinCorp. v. Rooney Pace Inc.
17
, it was held that the 
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main underlying purpose of the duty of loyalty is to prevent the directors to act in their own interest; to 
prohibit self-dealing that inheres in the fiduciary relationship. With duty of loyalty come many other 
responsibilities upon the director. They are required to keep any information received in their official 
capacity as confidential and therefore obligated not to disclose the same. Under business judgment rule a 
mere claim that the director is self-interested without any further evidence does not nullify the business 
judgment rule presumption.
18
 The Delaware Supreme Court stated in the case of Cede that a careful 
director shall exercise his or her duty of loyalty in order to protect the interest of the corporation, as well 
as, refrain from causing injury to the corporation through depriving it from its profit, advantage or 
enable it to make reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
19
 
The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule: Anallysis 
 “The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule are Bound Together in an Enigma.”
20
 
The director‟s duty of care is frequently kept parallel with duty of care in tort law.
21
At the point 
when company law expresses that an executive should go about as a "normally cautious and judicious" 
individual as held in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
22
, and breach of „duty of care‟ is characterized 
as “gross negligence.”
23
 Under a right account of the tort homology, the duty of care and the business 
judgment rule  are not anti-poles of a mystery, but rather are corresponding standards overseeing 
obligation and its addendum.  
Two principles play major role here. First under the tort precept of industry traditions, the extent 
of a director's duty of care mirrors the inferred „standard of care‟ that would be embraced by business 
members. A tort based suggestion is reliable with the predominant offer-acceptance hypothesis of 
corporate law, and it demonstrates that the carelessness standard would not make a difference to the 
substance of business choices. Second, theories of immaculate lucrative misfortune give the 
establishment standards to decide and suggest that duty of care on part of directors‟ does not envelop 
carelessly delivered business misfortune. 
The classic case of Smith v Van Gorkom
24
 court holding the director‟s liable decided that the 
most apt criteria of review was “gross negligence” and for the first time stated that there was breach of 
duty of care with reference to the business judgment rule thus Delaware Supreme Court held that 
board‟s met this standard. Many years later Delaware Apex court again ruled that directors are liable for 
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breach of duty of care on their part in Cede & co. v. Technicolor’s, Inc.
25
 case was almost similar to that 
of Van Gorkam (supra). In chancery court, Chancellor William Allen, pronounced "grave doubts" that 
the directors‟ fulfilled the Gorkam (supra) standard.
26
  
In both the above mentioned cases the BJR did not safeguard the board because of the finding of 
breach of duty on their part. In Delaware, the duty of care is restricted by substantive-procedural tussle 
which was expressed in Brehem v. Eisner
27
: 
„As for the plaintiffs' contention that the board flunk to exercise "substantive due care," we 
should note that such a notion is alien to the business judgment rule. Courts do not assess, contemplate 
or quantify directors' actions. We do not even determine if they are fair-minded in this context. Due care 
in reference to the decision making is that process is adopted with due care only.‟ 
A new concept of business judgment was articulated in Arson v. Lewis 
28
 which says that rule is 
nothing but a presumption that while making business decisions the board acted on an informed basis, 
bonafide in honest belief that the decision so taken was in the best interest of the company.
29
 
Kamin v. American Express Co.
30
 is a notable instance of business judgment rule at work. In 
this case American bank bought stake in an investment bank, but later its value declined and board 
decided to divest the same. Board had two options either to sell the stake or to distribute it by way of 
special in-kind dividends to the shareholders. By going with the first option they would have incurred 
$25 million loss on turnover which would result in tax saving of approximately $8 million. And 
distribution of dividends would have saved loss but would have forfeited tax advantage. The board after 
evaluation and going through both the options made a wrong decision and issued special dividends. 
Board believed that a reduction in income would lower the share price. The directors wanted to take 
$8million cash on the table or no cash at all. 
Prima facie the decision taken was wrong was clear still court dismissed plaintiff‟s appeal by 
applying doctrine of business judgment rule. As board was reasonably informed and went through 
proper process with due care and skill. Held that: board‟s mistake "presents no basis for the 




Therefore business judgment rule can be substantiated on several policy grounds. First 
reasoning in favor of business judgment rule is that courts are unskilled for reviewing business 
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decisions. Judges and experts have suggested that complication of business is not within the intellectual 
reach of courts. By saying that it is beyond competence of judges doesn‟t mean that decision so taken by 
the board is correct. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.
32
 court held that “the judges are not business experts.” 
In Auerbach v. Bennett
33
, court said that: „courts are essentially ill equipped with business matters and 
therefore rarely called to judge what should be a reasonable business judgments.‟ Thus courts practically 
are not well equipped to handle efficiently complex business decision making.
34
 Also judges‟ lack 
required competence to evaluate multiplex corporate decisions
35
 because they lack special knowledge 
with respect to working of corporations. Still many decisions have been reviewed judicially in the past. 
And they interfere only when plaintiff‟s able to rebut the presumption of business judgment rule. 
Second reasoning in favour of business judgment rule relates to „standard of conduct‟ versus 
„standard of review‟ digress in corporate law. Standard of conduct on part of directors require duty of 
care which is an objective norm facilitating directors‟ direction on how to manage the business and take 
business related decisions effectively. While standard of review is the legal rule with respect to business 
judgment rule which provides legal standard to courts to assess legal responsibility of directors‟. In other 
areas of law for example law of tort, review by courts and standard of conduct both relates to one 
standard that is for the purpose of judicial review. Whereas in corporate law the above mentioned 
standards are said to digress because of “institutional nature of corporation”
36
 directors usually try 
foreseeing the tentative outcome of their decision. They proceed on incomplete data and information and 
on the basis of required rationality. Keeping the standard of review by the courts and standard of care 
required by the directors‟ at par would result in great bias. For the judges deciding on matters which 
already took place given what is the outcome foresee ability is not needed because all the information 
relating to such decision are available which makes their task easy. Thus dichotomy of these two 
standards shows that directors‟ duty is a fiduciary one and not legal duty which is backed by force of 
law. And therefore minimizes courts role and tries to explain academically the concept of divergence 
between role of directors‟ and that of courts in corporate law. 
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Defenses for Breach of Duties: 
There are mainly three kinds of defences that a director can utilize in case of an alleged breach of 
duty. They are stated below: 
 The business judgment rule 
 Reliance on others 
 Use of a delegated power 
Of all the three we are concerned here with the business judgment rule. In case of an alleged 
breach of duty by a director the doctrine of business judgment rule can be taken as defense by the 
directors but given that it is an un-codified law its effectiveness continues to be skeptic and a matter of 
debate. No director can take the defense of Business Judgment Rule completely to avoid liability for 
breach of duty of due care and skill. The scope of this rule is very narrow as it is applicable on „business 
judgments‟ only. 
Takeover Defenses: 
Hostile takeovers are not very common in India. Advanced takeover defenses are majorly found 
in United States. The doctrine of Business Judgment Rule in USA has evolved from case laws having 
different sates having their different laws with respect to Business Judgment Rule. Delaware corporate 
law being the most developed one in this field.
37
 
In the case of Aronson v. Lewis
38
 held: the business judgment rule presumes that while making 
business decisions directors of a company acted on an informed basis, in honest belief and in good faith 
and action taken by them was in the best interest of the company. 
In Smith v. Van Gorkom
39
 in a case of cash out merger a group action was brought by 
shareholders. CEO after meeting a takeover specialist decided for cash out merger after having 
discussion with the specialist, without doing any adequate valuation of the proposal. And called a 
special meeting and persuaded directors to approve the same and place it for voting before the 
shareholders. Question framed by the CEO at the meeting was not as to whether price decided is the 
highest obtainable one, but that: whether price arrived at is fair one and the same should be placed 
before the shareholders for accepting or rejecting it. The Board of Directors after going through a 
presentation and without having any documents regarding the proposal decided to put forward the same 
for shareholder vote. 
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Held: the board of directors were grossly negligent while accepting the proposal and acted 
without due care and in an uninformed manner while agreeing to the merger proposal. Directors are 
required to go through the proposal before placing the same before the shareholders. Board cannot 
abdicate their duty by putting it before the shareholders. 
In Van Gorkom case court observed that even if there was substantial premium in the merger 
proposal price merger but other sound factors were not present and in their absence for evaluation mere 
fact of high price alone cannot be considered as the deciding factor for accessing the fairness of the 
proposal. Therefore just because a company is doing well does not mean that it cannot do any better. 
Conclusion: 
The aim of the business judgment rule in overpowering a risk involved corporate scenario is in 
part summarized by several former Vice-Chancellors of the Delaware Court of Chancery who write:  
„If law-trained judges are permitted to make after-the-fact judgments that business persons have 
made “unreasonable” or “negligent” business decisions for which they must respond in monetary 
damages, directors may, in the future avoid committing their companies to potentially valuable 
corporate opportunities that have some risk of failure. Highly qualified directors may also avoid service 
if they face liability risks that are disproportionate to the benefits of service.‟
40
 
At present the scope of this rule as judicially interpreted is that Board of directors of a 
corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which, ordinarily, 
careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances. A director must have such degree of skill 
that “may reasonably be expected from a person undertaking those duties” – as held in Norman v. 
Theodore Goddard.
41
 Referring to the case above it was held in a subsequent case that “courts may not 
in future be prepared to accept minimalistic standard of competence said to be tolerated by law” and 
that, courts may “Impose an increasing objectivity in determining whether directors have acted 
reasonably”. 
In the end we need to ask one question whether this rule is working in real sense or not? No 
doubt judicial review of corporate decision is done with the help of hindsight of judges whereas 
directors when taking any business decisions foresee the result and evaluate the options and choose one 
which will yield maximum benefit to the corporation and its stakeholders. The decision might not turn 
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out to be favorable in all the circumstances and once failed should not be taken as ground for holding the 
board personally liable as it is not possible for them to foresee the exact outcome and to review their 
decision would be unfavorable with approval of hindsight. But again other aspect to this is how far is it 
fair to give such substantial protection to the board of directors while duties they owe towards company 
as a fiduciary is getting casual. Say for example judicial reviewing of actions which are evident business 
wrong or instances where director would be able to understand that decision will be detrimental for the 
company in such situations protection under the will turn out to be against the interest of corporation and 
there courts need to step in and take strict actions and should not follow the presumption rule given the 
change in business era it will be desirable to have some altercations in the rule if not for stakeholders as 
a whole then at least from the perspective of shareholders. 
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